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he steady consolidation of neo-liberalism since the 1980s has 
presented several challenges to unions in North America. Through 
the promotion of free trade, the extension of property rights and 
the restructuring of the state, the era of neo-liberalism has undermined gains 
made by workers, and has made the terrain of struggle more daunting for 
unions. The current challenges should not be seen solely as emanating from the 
state. Changes in the organization of work, as well as shifts from manufacturing 
to the service sector, both part of the economic base of neo-liberalism, are also 
implicated in the common threats to organized labour and workers more 
generally. These common pressures on labour in Canada, the United States and 
Mexico, however, have resulted in different outcomes for the three movements. 
Many have suggested that these common pressures should be met with an 
increased emphasis on transnational labour cooperation. While this would likely 
be a good strategy, there has not yet developed a base on which to build this, nor 
is it possible to build international solidarity without first building capacities at 
the local level, and the level of the nation state. 
 
COMMON PRESSURES: NEO-LIBERALISM, THE LABOUR MARKET AND 
THE STATE 
 
The labour movements of North America have been forced to confront 
three common pressures, economic slowdown, neo-liberal labour market 
policies, and the internationalization of capital. To varying degrees, these 
pressures have diminished the capacities of national labour movements to 
organize and represent the interests of workers. This section will outline the 
general tendencies of these three pressures. Section two will provide some 
measure of how the neo-liberalism has registered in each country. The final 
section will evaluate the current state of international solidarity, as well as its 
strategic potential in resisting neo-liberalism. 
Neo-liberalism has its origins in the collapse of the post-war boom, a 
period which saw the promotion of inward economic development, rapid 
T
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growth, expansionary welfare policies, and the strengthening of the bargaining 
power of unions. Beginning in the 1970s, the advanced capitalist economies were 
faced with economic slowdown, which was to last throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. As a response to economic instability and increased competition, 
employers began a series of labour saving plant shutdowns and a major shift of 
production to lower union density locales in the southern U.S. (and in part to 
northern Mexico). Further restructuring came in the form of the rise of service 
sector employment, lean production, flexible manufacturing, and non-standard 
work arrangements (Albo, 1990; Campbell et al, 1999). This ‘employers’ offensive’ 
at the workplace was also linked to capital’s greater push toward trade 
liberalization and continental integration, in part as a means to increase inter-
worker competition, and continue the trends, begun in the 1980s, of wage 
compression and widening gaps between the share of value taken by capital and 
that taken by workers (OECD, 2004: 11, 18-9, 129; Commission for Labour Co-
operation, 2003:6).  
A second pressure has come in the form of neo-liberal flexible labour 
market policies. One element of this involves restrictions on access to, and 
reduced benefits for, programs such as unemployment insurance or social 
assistance, which have come to be seen as disincentives to work, causing labour 
market rigidities. Governments have, in general, given up policies geared toward 
full employment, preferring instead to maintain a ready pool of labour available 
to take up new work, particularly in the service sector – by far the most common 
form of new employment – as it becomes available (Economic Council of 
Canada, 1990). Flexible labour market policy comes also in the form of 
restrictions on union organizing and free collective bargaining. These restrictions 
include reliance on back-to-work legislation, and right-to-work legislation such 
as in the southern U.S. (Fantasia and Voss, 2004: 125; Panitch and Swartz, 2003). 
In Mexico, the situation for unions is exacerbated by mass privatization of state 
enterprises, linked to neo-liberal austerity programs.  
A third pressure is the internationalization of capital, which provides 
leverage for employers relative to the immobility of labour. NAFTA sets in place 
rules that restrict governments’ ability to impede capital mobility, or to actively 
pursue industrial development and social welfare. Increased competition that 
results from trade liberalization compels employers to drive down unit labour 
costs (Robinson, 1994: 664-5). Transnational corporations (TNCs) – primarily 
based in the U.S. – have used this increased leverage through threats of capital 
flight, as well as the expansion of international production networks, which 
allow production to be moved to lower wage zones. For example, workers in 
Mexico can earn as little as 1/10th of what is earned by workers in Canada and 
the U.S. for similar work (Moody, 1997: 70-1, 77). NAFTA did encourage a 
significant shift of some 2 million less skilled jobs to Mexico, particularly in the 
maquilas at the northern border (Roman and Velasco, 2004). Yet Mexican workers 
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themselves are faced with even lower wage competition from China and other 
parts of Latin America. The liberalized world market has everywhere put 
workers in competition with each other, further tipping the balance in favour of 
employers. 
 
UNEVEN RESULTS: THE CRISIS OF NORTH AMERICAN UNIONS 
 
In the face of the general pressures that neo-liberalism has brought (and 
those of NAFTA as one of its manifestations) unions in North America have been 
put on the defensive, and in some instances have been defeated. Yet given 
different historical patterns of development, organizational capacities and 
political circumstances, the three different labour movements have seen varied 
results of, and responses to, neo-liberalism. It is to these divergent outcomes that 




In many respects, Canadian unions have been the most successful at 
resisting neo-liberalism. Still, the common pressures discussed above have 
resulted in a union density that has fallen from 40 percent in 1983 to 31 percent in 
2003 (Panitch and Swartz, 2003: 245). While public sector density remains at 72.5 
percent, only 18 percent of private sector workers are organized. Density in 
manufacturing has declined from 45.5 percent in 1988 (the last year before the 
signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement), to 32.4 percent in 2002 
(Jackson, 2003:10). With the rise of service sector work, in which the industrial 
relations regime has made it difficult to organize, unions’ capacity to intervene in 
the labour market, and act as a central vehicle forming and representing the 
interests of workers will continue to be strained.  
Still, Canada has seen an increase in the absolute number of workers in 
unions, while unions in 13 OECD countries have seen an absolute decline in 
membership (Ogmundson and Doyle, 2002: 416). The ability to stem the tide of 
de-unionization has, to a large degree, been the result of manufacturing sector 
unions like the CAW and USWA attempting to move into service sector 
organizing, creating large, internally diverse general unions (Yates, 2000: 31-2). 
To a large degree, however, the increase in membership of these two unions is a 
result of mergers with smaller unions. But this has, in turn, caused its own 
problems of raiding and organizing competition between unions, with the CLC 
offering little direction on issues of jurisdiction. At the 2005 CLC convention, 
however a resolution was passed that might make it easier to effectively manage 
conflicts over raiding. The impetus for this resolution was a conflict between 
CUPE and “a rogue local” of the IWA, which raided CUPE/Hospital Employees 
Union locals in British Columbia. 
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More so than other labour movements in the OECD, Canadian unions 
have attempted to resist through the use of strikes. In absolute terms, however, 
the Canadian strike rate shows a steady decline from 1218 in 1974 to 579 in 1990, 
and only 379 strikes in 2000 (which represents a slight rebound from the mid-
1990s) (Ogmundson and Doyle, 2002: 422; Panitch and Swartz, 2003: 244). The 
willingness to strike should be understood in the context of extensive 
government reliance on back-to-work legislation, which can undermine the 
effectiveness of strikes. The declining strike rate should also be viewed in light of 
patterns of concession bargaining, an ongoing problem since the 1980s, and 
labour management partnerships. Among the most dramatic cases of both was a 
2003 agreement between the UFCW and the Loblaws chain of grocery stores. The 
employer, feeling competitive pressures from Wal-Mart, demanded that the 
union open its collective agreement and accept wage rollbacks. Under pressure 
from the employer to help manage these competitive forces, the UFCW 
leadership agreed to the concessions behind closed doors and then brought the 
changes to rank and file members as a done deal (Vasil, 2003). 
Even the CAW, which split from the UAW in 1985 as a protest against the 
American union’s insistence on concession bargaining (Gindin, 1995), has 
engaged in some forms of partnerships. There appears to be an increasing 
frequency of labour-management cooperation in the automotive sector, usually 
springing from pacts between individual locals and plant managers, but often 
supported (both implicitly and explicitly) by the national leadership (Wells, 1997: 
169-70), this is not to suggest that individual unions or their leaders are the 
problem. Instead, this points to the fact that all unions, no matter how confident 
and militant, are subject to the same pressures. 
Concessions and partnerships, coupled with a reduced propensity to 
strike, are reason for concern. Still, Canadian labour does continue the fight back. 
Opposition to hard line neo-liberal governments still brings workers to the 
streets in protest. Two examples are the Days of Action in Ontario, which 
challenged the Conservative government of Mike Harris (Munro, 1997), and 
resistance to the anti-labour agenda of the Campbell government in British 
Columbia. And unions have been working towards building ties to community 
groups in common struggle to protect public ownership of electricity, and public 
delivery of health care, to name but two issues. This fledgling focus on social 
movement unionism can be a tool used to rebuild unions’ capacity to resist neo-
liberalism (Moody, 1997; CAW/TCA 2003). But these strategies remain ad hoc 
and generally do not last beyond individual battles. Canadian unions remain 
resilient, but this appears to be impressive primarily in relation to the extremely 
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THE UNITED STATES 
 
The labour movement in the U.S. entered the neo-liberal era substantially behind 
its northern counterpart. Organizationally, the business unionism that has 
characterized the movement in the U.S., and the hierarchical structures on which 
this is based, have left unions in a poor position to mobilize members in a fight 
back strategy (Nissen, 2003a). Furthermore, the regime of industrial relations has 
been highly restrictive. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which limited the ability of 
unions to organize, was merely the first blow. So-called ‘right to work’ laws, and 
National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) signals that have shown its willingness 
to allow anti-union tactics, ranging from hiring anti-union consultants to actually 
firing employees engaged in organizing, have also contributed to an incredibly 
difficult environment in which unions must operate. 
While the Taft-Hartley Act was the first prong of the legislative assault, it 
should be noted that union density reached its peak of 31.8 percent in 1955, eight 
years after the act was passed. It was not until after 1979, and the consolidation 
of neo-liberalism, that union density declined precipitously, falling to 13.5 
percent in 2001 (data on density in Panitch and Swartz, 2003: 245). In the private 
sector, density is down to a mere nine percent (Levi, 2003: 47). The declining 
strike rate in the U.S. is another sign of American labour’s decline. In 1969 there 
were 412 strikes involving more than 1000 workers. By 1999 it was down to 17, 
and in 2001 there were 29 such strikes (Levi, 2003: 48; Statistics Canada, 2004). 
These figures demonstrate the extremely weak position of unions in the U.S., 
suggesting a tremendous amount of rebuilding will be necessary if any effective 
resistance is to take hold. 
Longstanding practices of business unionism have meant that the 
primary response of American unions to concessionary bargaining has been to 
work in partnership with employers. Important examples of this trend include 
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE, now UNITE-
HERE) partnerships at both Xerox and Levi Straus, the United Steel Workers of 
America with several steel manufacturing plants, and partnerships entered into 
by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) at several 
telecommunications firms. One of the most significant partnership arrangements 
is between the United Auto Workers and Saturn in Spring Hill Tennessee, which 
included “directed work teams, off-line problem solving teams, labor-
management committees, and the like. But all levels of staff and line 
management are filled with dual union and management personnel, making 
Saturn a co-management partnership example….” (Nissen, 2003b: 137). In 
essence, this kind of partnership encourages unions to take on the role of 
managers, assisting in solving problems for employers, even if these solutions 
involve the unions policing their own members. Such partnerships are not 
without their contradictions though. In 1999, after rank and file mobilization for 
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change, the existing executive was removed from office. The new executive was 
able then to negotiate a new contract that eliminated some of the terms of the 
partnership (Nissen, 2003b: 137).   
These organizational weaknesses remain a major obstacle to any 
aspirations for a revitalization of the North American labour movement as a 
whole. It has been reflected directly in the American labour movement’s position 
on NAFTA.  After largely ignoring the implications of the original Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement, the AFL-CIO mounted an extensive campaign against 
NAFTA, and it has continued to oppose other free trade agreements. This has 
been as much, if not more, about defensive protection of vulnerable unionized 
jobs and sectors in the U.S., as opposed to an alternative societal project for 
reorganizing work and industry. A sign of the AFL-CIO’s continuing ambiguous 
and often conflicting responses to trade expansion can be seen in its 
condemnation of the creation of a Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), while simultaneously arguing for inclusion of protections of workers’ 
rights in all future trade agreements.  And even as it calls for inclusion of labour 
protections in new agreements, American labour condemns the North American 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) as an ineffective tool for the 
advancement of labour rights, particularly with regard to employer uses of 




Historically, the working class in Mexico has been enmeshed in 
corporatist structures of the state. This has resulted in a lack of union autonomy 
from the state, and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the instrument of 
one-party domination within Mexico until recently (Rodriguez, 1998: 71). The 
largest Mexican union federation, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico 
(CTM) along with the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos 
(CROC), Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) and the Congreso del 
Trabajo (CT), all official unions tied to the authoritarian corporatist arrangements, 
represent the majority of Mexico’s unionized workers. Authoritarian corporatist 
arrangements have resulted in unions that have acted as coercive agents against 
their members. Corrupt union bosses became de facto members of the state 
apparatus, and their privileged positions became dependent upon keeping 
militant workers in check. As a result, union densities were higher than in other, 
comparable states, but were nonetheless ineffectual at improving working 
conditions (Roman and Arregui, 1998: 128). In 2000, overall union density in 
Mexico was ten percent lower than it was in the early 1980s. With union leaders 
often in collaborative relationships with employers and the state, internal 
practices of democracy and independent action for unions were all but 
impossible. In addition, state coercion was also prominent. Strike activity was 
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traditionally very low as the state made the conditions for work stoppages illegal 
in most cases. In those cases where strikes did occur, direct physical coercion was 
regularly used (Cockcroft, 1998: 160). 
The expansion of production in maquiladora zones along the Mexico-US 
border has made little room for new independent unions to organize. Although 
job growth in these regions has been substantial (ten times its 1981 level while 
non-maquila employment in manufacturing was lower in 2000 than it was in 
1981) unionization rates and standards of living have been dismal (Cypher, 2001: 
20; Wise, Salazar, Carlsen, 2003, 215).  Frequently, before plants are even opened 
in the maquiladoras, the existing ‘official unions’ will meet with employers to sign 
collective agreements that do little more than cover the basic provisions of the 
existing labour laws. Furthermore, these unions do little to support workers in 
grievances against employers (Obrera, 2003: 154-5). For these unions, stable 
collective bargaining helps maintain membership levels and thus a degree of 
legitimacy within the Mexican state. For Mexican capitalists, the presence of 
compliant unions guarantees that independent unions with a more aggressive 
project for protecting workers will have a much more difficult time trying to 
organize these workers. 
Public sector employees have been just as affected by restructuring in 
Mexico. As part of its neo-liberal restructuring program, the Mexican state has 
taken a very active policy of privatizing state assets. The Mexican state had 
traditionally taken a strong role in promoting economic development, and thus 
acquired a large number of public corporations, for example, in steel, 
telecommunications, mining and oil, to facilitate this process. As part of 
restructuring programs prompted by the state by trade integration and structural 
adjustment policies from the international lending agencies and the U.S. 
government, but also because of internal pressures from Mexican capitalists for 
divestment, hundreds of these corporations were sold off (Williams, 2001: 91-2). 
In order to make the sale of these corporations more attractive, unions were 
pressured to grant concessions in terms of wages and working conditions. Even 
in the face of resistance by public sector unions (and peasant rebellions in some 
of the regions of Mexico), privatization could not be stopped. 
 
THE STATE OF LABOUR INTERNATIONALISM IN NORTH AMERICA 
 
Many union activists and academics have suggested that unions in 
Canada and the U.S. could assist workers in Mexico in their bid for an 
independent and effective structure. The North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation (NAALC) was, in part, intended to do just this. Under pressure 
from the AFL-CIO, the Clinton administration pressed for inclusion of the labour 
side agreement in NAFTA in 1993 (Williams, 1996). The agreement itself is 
intended to promote the enforcement of eleven core labour rights, “including 
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freedom of association and the right to organize, free collective bargaining, 
prohibitions on child labour, and the right to safe and healthy work 
environments” (Singh, 2002: 438). Through the agreement, National 
Administration Offices (NAOs) are established in each country to process any 
complaints made by individuals or organizations. If a claim is deemed to have 
sufficient merit, and if initial negotiations do not resolve the dispute, the NAO 
can send disputes to conciliation and arbitration.  To date, however, no dispute 
had gone this far (Singh, 2002: 438). Although the AFL-CIO’s promotion of the 
NAALC was alleged to have been designed to force Mexico to uphold the union 
protections guaranteed in its constitution, and thus create conditions for a strong 
independent Mexican labour movement, the underlying reason was to protect 
jobs in the U.S. The NAALC is the only example of the creation of a 
supranational body that is intended to regulate labour under NAFTA, but its 
limited capacity to effectively sanction states that violate the agreement renders it 
almost meaningless. Moreover, the NAALC, despite its claim to promote labour 
cooperation, has no effective means by which to facilitate connections between 
the labour movements of North America. This leaves the three labour 
movements to focus political activities on their own national states, and to 
pursue international linkages in the absence of any form of continental state 
apparatus actually enforcing freedom of association and other labour rights. 
Proposals to create independent ties between labour movements can be 
classified as ‘international solidarity’, union strategies to act internationally to 
counter an already internationalized capitalist class (Moody, 1997).  This could be 
a positive strategy, instituted by unions themselves, to create active links that 
provide mutual support in struggles. There are, however, limitations to 
proposals for international solidarity. Unions within each country remain 
internally fragmented. They have exhibited limited capacity to coordinate 
strategy within national borders (indeed, the union centrals in all three countries 
seem all but strategically incapacitated), let alone between different national 
union movements with distinct histories and established practices. It will also be 
necessary to develop greater rank and file participation in democratically 
structured national and local unions if new political projects are to be sustained 
(Gindin and Stanford, 2003: 435-6). In the absence of direct member involvement, 
links between movements will simply be formalistic agreements without the 
capacity to be implemented fully. Finally, even though there has been movement 
towards the creation of a single North American market space, this has not 
translated into a unified political space or the differentiation of national 
economic developments and dilemmas. Unions still negotiate locally, and are 
bound by national state-based industrial relations regimes that regulate union 
activities. Without the deepening of democratic sovereignty within national 
states (which enables workers and citizens to exercise some policy capacity over 
the policy issues that most immediately affect them in their daily lives), and the 
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reformation of working class and union capacities at the local, sectoral, and 
national levels, international struggles, as imperative as they are to undertake, 
will be limited in their impacts.   
In the immediate future at least, international solidarity might assist 
unions in organizing at particular plants (as unions in one space lend organizing 
and financial resources to workers elsewhere), or might be able to act to try to 
prevent certain activities (for example, protests against neo-liberal trade deals or 
coordinated boycotts of employers engaging in abhorrent employment 
practices). But this strategy is not likely to put meaningful proposals on the 
political agenda. Such proposals, made at the level of the nation state, could 
include attempts to control capital flows, thereby reducing the capacity of 
employers to use the threat of capital flight to wring concessions out of unions. 
Moreover, controls on capital mobility would enable states effectively to plan 
trade (and aid), targeting investment in areas that promote human welfare. 
Proposals could also include labour law reform. In all three countries, reforms 
might also revolve around changes that facilitate organizing in the service sector 
to boost union density, or that include sectoral bargaining. Sectoral bargaining 
would allow workers in sectors characterized by small workplaces to negotiate 
en masse with employers, giving unions greater protection against competitive 
pressures. Because these proposals grate against the logic of neo-liberalism, they 
are not likely to be implemented any time soon. But it is only through 
challenging the logic of neo-liberalism that union movements of North America 
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